The upheaval of the French Revolution subtly but profoundly changed the meaning of the word répression . By 1802 the long-standing emphasis on containing disorder gave way to a new emphasis on suppressing disorder; in other words, repression as a defensive, prophylactic action was replaced conceptually by repression as an interventionist and transformative action. Repression did not merely defend order, it brought order out of disorder. The timing of this semantic shift indicates that the origins of the Napoleonic system of repression lay mainly in efforts to end the tumult of the French Revolution by imposing a new republican order on France. The great difficulty republicans experienced in achieving their purpose tainted their means and in doing so thwarted their ends. Moreover, Revolutionary and Napoleonic France used similar methods to impose a new form of order in subjugated territories only to find that there too both the methods and outcome could be compromised. * * * My previous work has described the form of rule that gradually emerged in France between the Fructidor coup d'état (September 1797) and Bonaparte becoming First Consul for Life (August 1802) as 'liberal authoritarianism.' 1 This phrase means more than strengthening the executive at the expense of democracy and parliamentary governance. It also reflects an increasingly cogent and fixed response to the tension between the liberal democratic polity sought by French revolutionaries and the repeated recourse by successive regimes to exceptional measures that violated these principles in the name of public safety. The resulting form of rule depended on a powerful, yet highly regulated, police and judicial apparatus combined with clearly defined and thoroughly integrated exceptions to liberal constitutional norms in the form of martial law, expedited justice and political policing. This was the essence of the Napoleonic system of repression.
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This system was not planned, but resulted from complicated interplay between efforts to restore order and efforts to impose a revolutionary republic. The excesses committed during the Terror tainted any later use of coercive force by the republic. Furthermore, after 1794 the Thermidorian politicians who claimed their authority on the basis of having ended the Terror, nonetheless repeatedly resorted to similar methods-political purges, summary justice, and military repression-always in the name of saving liberty and the republic. Overwhelming hostility to the young republic meant that the constitutional regime that began in 1795 had to be rigorously defended and often simply imposed by force. Thus, in 1795 when it assumed office, the Directory began with a split personality. It was designed as a liberal democratic republic whose legitimacy would rest on representative democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, but it opened with compromised elections, an amnesty for 'terrorists,' renewed persecution of priests and émigrés, and an expansionist war effort. As a result, Directorial politicians found it difficult to separate methods of repression needed to preserve the regime from methods of persecution that favoured a political faction or forced the pace of social change.
The tension between the rule of law as one of the Directory's basic sources of legitimacy and the need to restore order as one of its most pressing problems placed a heavy burden on the new system of criminal justice. Though more effective than often claimed, the criminal courts of the Directory did not perform well when it came to enforcing the laws against 'political crimes'. Jurors tended to sympathize with resistance to the state, especially when it involved refractory priests, reluctant conscripts, or royalist brigands. The antirepublican results of the elections of spring 1797 brought a near collapse in government authority and a commensurate surge in violence. The Directory responded with the Fructidor coup d'état and a battery of exceptional measures. Endemic political violence and rampant brigandage had made it clear that some exceptions to constitutionalism and the rule of law were needed to restore the Republic's authority. However, republican notions about the sources of opposition, which they saw as royalist officials, émigré nobles and refractory priests, shaped the exceptional measures. These ranged from a massive purge of officials, whether elected or appointed, to giving the government exclusive authority to declare individual cities and towns under 'state of siege', thereby transferring all police powers to the local army commander. 2 The application of these measures, however, often made them look less like necessary means to defend the republic and more like opportunities to press the social and cultural revolution, or simply to gain a factional advantage at the local level.
The same mix of defensive measures and social coercion characterized the Directory's response to the crisis of 1799. Witness the discrimination against former nobles added to the law of hostages and the forced loan thereby again combining responses to a security crisis with political persecution. At the same time, the army received ever greater authority to impose the 'state of siege', to command national guardsmen formed up as mobile columns, and to use military justice to prosecute civilians. All of these measures were used
